美國(guó)正在出現(xiàn)一種新的思潮，將中美關(guān)系限定在零和沖突的框架里。不久前，作為美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院政策規(guī)劃主管（該職位曾經(jīng)由冷戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)略家喬治·凱南擔(dān)任）的凱潤(rùn)·斯金納在新美國(guó)基金會(huì)組織的論壇上發(fā)表了一通言論，非常說(shuō)明問(wèn)題。她提出，中美之間的敵對(duì)關(guān)系是“美國(guó)與一個(gè)很不同的文明和不同的意識(shí)形態(tài)之間的爭(zhēng)斗，是美國(guó)過(guò)去從未遇到的”。她補(bǔ)充道，這是“美國(guó)首次以一個(gè)由非高加索人種構(gòu)成的大國(guó)作為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手”。她顯然忘記了美國(guó)與日本的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。但更重要的是，她透過(guò)文明和種族戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的框架來(lái)看待中美關(guān)系，而文明和種族戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是不可調(diào)和的沖突。這絕非偶然。美國(guó)方面也沒(méi)有調(diào)整斯金納女士的職位。

除了文明和種族，還有許多人將中美沖突描述為一場(chǎng)圍繞著意識(shí)形態(tài)和權(quán)力展開(kāi)的斗爭(zhēng)。強(qiáng)調(diào)意識(shí)形態(tài)的人認(rèn)為中國(guó)官方強(qiáng)化了馬克思主義話(huà)語(yǔ)，黨扮演的角色也變得更加突出。強(qiáng)調(diào)權(quán)力的人則注意到中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力的崛起。這兩種觀點(diǎn)都指向中美長(zhǎng)期沖突。

這是當(dāng)前時(shí)代最重要的地緣政治發(fā)展趨勢(shì)。特別關(guān)鍵的一點(diǎn)在于，中美長(zhǎng)期沖突將迫使其他所有國(guó)家選邊站隊(duì)，保持中立將越來(lái)越難。這個(gè)趨勢(shì)不僅重要，而且十分危險(xiǎn)。中美關(guān)系原本雖然棘手但仍處于可控范疇以?xún)?nèi)，但如今的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在于，它有可能莫名其妙地演變?yōu)橐粓?chǎng)全盤(pán)沖突。

中國(guó)的意識(shí)形態(tài)不像蘇聯(lián)那樣，它對(duì)自由主義民主沒(méi)有什么威脅。西方的右翼煽動(dòng)分子反倒比中國(guó)更危險(xiǎn)。任何企圖阻攔中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)和技術(shù)崛起的嘗試幾乎肯定會(huì)遭遇失敗。更糟糕的是，它會(huì)引起中國(guó)人民深深的敵意。隨著中國(guó)人民生活越來(lái)越富足、受教育程度越來(lái)越高，他們要求掌握自己的命運(yùn)。從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看，這樣的要求終究會(huì)得到滿(mǎn)足，但如果中國(guó)自然崛起的進(jìn)程受到威脅，那這個(gè)進(jìn)程就會(huì)大受挫折。此外，中國(guó)的崛起并不是導(dǎo)致西方弊病纏身的重要原因。相比之下，西方國(guó)家精英階層的冷漠和無(wú)能才是關(guān)鍵。什么叫做知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)盜竊？它其實(shí)在很大程度上反映了一種事實(shí)，即崛起當(dāng)中的經(jīng)濟(jì)體必然試圖掌握時(shí)下最先進(jìn)的技術(shù)。說(shuō)到底，企圖永遠(yuǎn)維持4%的人對(duì)全人類(lèi)的統(tǒng)治才是非法的。

這當(dāng)然不是說(shuō)，中國(guó)說(shuō)什么做什么我們都應(yīng)該接受。相反，西方對(duì)待中國(guó)的最佳方式是矢志不渝地堅(jiān)持自由、民主、以規(guī)則為基礎(chǔ)的多邊主義，以及全球合作等價(jià)值觀。這些思想曾經(jīng)在全球范圍內(nèi)團(tuán)結(jié)了許多人，使他們成為美國(guó)的支持者。其中許多理念至今仍然吸引著許多中國(guó)人。今天，與從事環(huán)境、商業(yè)與和平事業(yè)時(shí)一樣，西方在與崛起的中國(guó)攜手合作的同時(shí)，也完全可以堅(jiān)持這些思想，而且還要比過(guò)去更加堅(jiān)定，這至關(guān)重要。

競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作并重的相處之道才是中國(guó)與西方正確的前進(jìn)方向。西方在應(yīng)對(duì)中國(guó)崛起時(shí)，既要與志同道合的盟友密切合作，也要給予中國(guó)足夠的尊重。當(dāng)前狀況的悲劇之處在于，特朗普政府在發(fā)動(dòng)中美沖突的同時(shí)，還在攻擊盟友，摧毀美國(guó)主導(dǎo)的戰(zhàn)后秩序。美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)發(fā)起的攻擊是一場(chǎng)在錯(cuò)誤的戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上發(fā)起、以錯(cuò)誤的方式進(jìn)行的錯(cuò)誤的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。唉，這便是我們現(xiàn)在所處的位置。

The looming 100-year US-China conflict

The disappearance of the Soviet Union left a big hole. The “war on terror” was an inadequate replacement. But China ticks all boxes. For the US, it can be the ideological, military and economic enemy many need. Here at last is a worthwhile opponent. That was the main conclusion I drew from this year’s Bilderberg meetings. Across-the-board rivalry with China is becoming an organising principle of US economic, foreign and security policies.

Whether it is Donald Trump’s organising principle is less important. The US president has the gut instincts of a nationalist and protectionist. Others provide both framework and details. The aim is US domination. The means is control over China, or separation from China. Anybody who believes a rules-based multilateral order, our globalised economy, or even harmonious international relations, are likely to survive this conflict is deluded.

The astonishing white paper on the trade conflict, published on Sunday by China, is proof. The — to me, depressing — fact is that on many points Chinese positions are right. The US focus on bilateral imbalances is economically illiterate. The view that theft of intellectual property has caused huge damage to the US is questionable. The proposition that China has grossly violated its commitments under its 2001 accession agreement to the World Trade Organization is hugely exaggerated.

Accusing China of cheating is hypocritical when almost all trade policy actions taken by the Trump administration are in breach of WTO rules, a fact implicitly conceded by its determination to destroy the dispute settlement system. The US negotiating position vis-à-vis China is that “might makes right”. This is particularly true of insisting that the Chinese accept the US role as judge, jury and executioner of the agreement.

A dispute over the terms of market opening or protection of intellectual property might be settled with careful negotiation. Such a settlement might even help China, since it would lighten the heavy hand of the state and promote market-oriented reform. But the issues are now too vexed for such a resolution. This is partly because of the bitter breakdown in negotiation. It is still more because the US debate is increasingly over whether integration with China’s state-led economy is desirable. The fear over Huawei focuses on national security and technological autonomy. Liberal commerce is increasingly seen as “trading with the enemy”.

A framing of relations with China as one of zero-sum conflict is emerging. Recent remarks by Kiron Skinner, the US state department’s policy planning director (a job once held by cold war strategist George Kennan) are revealing. Rivalry with Beijing, she suggested at a forum organised by New America, is “a fight with a really different civilisation and a different ideology, and the United States hasn’t had that before”. She added that this would be “the first time that we will have a great power competitor that is not Caucasian”. The war with Japan is forgotten. But the big point is her framing of this as a civilisational and racial war and so as an insoluble conflict. This cannot be accidental. She is also still in her job.

Others present the conflict as one over ideology and power. Those emphasising the former point to President Xi Jinping’s Marxist rhetoric and the reinforced role of the Communist party. Those emphasising the latter point to China’s rising economic might. Both perspectives suggest perpetual conflict.

This is the most important geopolitical development of our era. Not least, it will increasingly force everybody else to take sides or fight hard for neutrality. But it is not only important. It is dangerous. It risks turning a manageable, albeit vexed, relationship into all-embracing conflict, for no good reason.

China’s ideology is not a threat to liberal democracy in the way the Soviet Union’s was. Rightwing demagogues are far more dangerous. An effort to halt China’s economic and technological rise is almost certain to fail. Worse, it will foment deep hostility in the Chinese people. In the long run, the demands of an increasingly prosperous and well-educated people for control over their lives might still win out. But that is far less likely if China’s natural rise is threatened. Moreover, the rise of China is not an important cause of western malaise. That reflects far more the indifference and incompetence of domestic elites. What is seen as theft of intellectual property reflects, in large part, the inevitable attempt of a rising economy to master the technologies of the day. Above all, an attempt to preserve the domination of 4 per cent of humanity over the rest is illegitimate.

This certainly does not mean accepting everything China does or says. On the contrary, the best way for the west to deal with China is to insist on the abiding values of freedom, democracy, rules-based multilateralism and global co-operation. These ideas made many around the globe supporters of the US in the past. They still captivate many Chinese people today. It is quite possible to uphold these ideas, indeed insist upon them far more strongly, while co-operating with a rising China where that is essential, as over protecting the natural environment, commerce and peace.  

A blend of competition with co-operation is the right way forward. Such an approach to managing China’s rise must include co-operating closely with like-minded allies and treating China with respect. The tragedy in what is now happening is that the administration is simultaneously launching a conflict between the two powers, attacking its allies and destroying the institutions of the postwar US-led order. Today’s attack on China is the wrong war, fought in the wrong way, on the wrong terrain. Alas, this is where we now are. 

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